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2019

Introduction

Cobalt Strike is a threat emulation tool used by red teams and advanced persistent threats for gaining and maintaining a foothold on networks. This blog post will cover the detection of Cobalt Strike based off a piece of malware identified from Virus Total:

 

NOTE: The malware sample was downloaded and executed in a malware VM under analysts constant supervision as this was/is live malware.

The Detection in NetWitness Packets

NetWitness Packets pulls apart characteristics of the traffic it sees. It does this via a number of Lua parsers that reside on the Packet Decoder itself. Some of the Lua parsers have option files associated with them that parse out additional metadata for analysis. One of these is the HTTP Lua parser, which has an associated HTTP Lua options file, you can view this by navigating to Admin  Services ⮞ Decoder ⮞ Config ⮞ Files - and selecting HTTP_lua_options.lua from the drop down. The option we are interested in for this blog post is the headerCatalog() - making this return true will register the HTTP Headers in the request and response under the meta keys:

  • http.request
  • http.response

 

And the associated values for the headers will be registered under:

  • req.uniq
  • resp.uniq

 

NOTE: This feature is not available in the default options file due to potential performance considerations it may have on the Decoder. This feature is experimental and may be deprecated at any time, so please use this feature with caution, and monitor the health of all components if enabling. Also, please look into the customHeader() function prior to enabling this, as that is a less intensive substitute that could fit your use cases.

 

There are a variety of options that can be enabled here. For more details, it is suggested to read the Hunting Guide - https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341.

 

These keys will need to be indexed on the Concentrator, and the following addition to the index-concentrator-custom.xml file is suggested:

<key description="HTTP Request Header" format="Text" level="IndexValues" name="http.request" defaultAction="Closed" valueMax="5000" />
<key description="HTTP Response Header" format="Text" level="IndexValues" name="http.response" defaultAction="Closed" valueMax="5000" />
<key description="Unique HTTP Request Header" level="IndexKeys" name="req.uniq" format="Text" defaultAction="Closed"/>
<key description="Unique HTTP Response Header" level="IndexKeys" name="resp.uniq" format="Text" defaultAction="Closed"/>

 

 

The purpose for this, amongst others, is that the trial version of Cobalt Strike has a distinctive HTTP Header that we, as analysts, would like to see: https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2015/10/14/the-cobalt-strike-trials-evil-bit/. This HTTP header is X-Malware - and with our new option enabled, this header is easy to spot:

NOTE: While this is one use case to demonstrate the value of extracting the HTTP Headers, this metadata proves incredibly valueable across the board, as looking for uncommon headers can help lead analysts to uncover and track malicious activity. Another example where this was useful can be seen in one of the previous posts regarding POSH C2, whereby an application rule was created to look for the incorrectly supplied cachecontrol HTTP response header: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2019/03/04/command-and-control-poshc2

 

Pivoting off this header and opening the Event Analysis view, we can see a HTTP GET request for KHSw, which was direct to IP over port 666 and had a low header count with no referrer - this should stand out as suspicious even without the initial indicator we used for analysis:

 

If we had decided to look for traffic using the Service Analysis key, which pulls apart the characteristics of the traffic, we would have been able to pivot of off these metadata values to whittle down our traffic to this as well:

 

Looking into the response for the GET request, we can see the X-Malware header we pivoted off of, and the stager being downloaded. Also, take notice of the EICAR test string in the X-Malware as well, this is indicative of a trial version of Cobalt Strike as well:

 

NetWitness Packets also has a parser to detect this string, and will populate the metadata, eicar test string, under the Session Analysis meta key (if the Eicar Lua parser is pushed from RSA Live) - this could be another great pivot point to detect this type of traffic:

 

Further looking into the Cobalt Strike traffic, we can start to uncover more details surrounding its behaviour. Upon analysis, we can see that there are multiple HTTP GET requests with no error (i.e. 200), and a content-length of zero, which stands out as suspicious behaviour - as well as this, there is a cookie that looks like a Base64 encoded string (equals at the end for padding) with no name/value pairs, cookies normally consist of name/value pairs, these two observations make the cookie anomalous:

 

Based off of this behaviour, we can start to think about how to build content to detect this type of behaviour. Heading back to our HTTP Lua options file on the Decoder, we can see another option named, customHeaders() - this allows us to extract the values of HTTP headers in a field of our choosing. This means we can choose to extract the cookie into a meta key named cookie, and content-length into a key named http.respsize - this allows us to map a specific HTTP header value to a key so we can create some content based off of the behaviours we previously observed:

 

After making the above change, we need to add the following keys to our index-concentrator-custom.xml file as well - these are set to the index level of, keys, as the values that can be returned are unbounded and we don't want to bloat the index:

<key description="Cookie" format="Text" level="IndexKeys" name="cookie" defaultAction="Closed"  />
<key description="HTTP Response Size" format="Text" level="IndexKeys" name="http.respsize" defaultAction="Closed" />

 

Now we can work on creating our application rules. Firstly, we wanted to alert on the suspicious GET requests we were seeing:

service = 80 && action = 'get' && error !exists && http.respsize = '0' && content='application/octet-stream'

And for the anomalous cookie, we can use the following logic. This will look for no name/value pairs being present and the use of equals signs at the end of the string which can indicate padding for Base64 encoded strings:

service = 80 && cookie regex '^[^=]+=*$' && content='application/octet-stream'

These will be two separate application rules that will be pushed to the Decoders:

 

Now we can start to track the activity of Cobalt Strike easily in the Investigate view. This could also potentially alert the analyst to other infected hosts in their environment. This is why it is important to analyse the malicious traffic and create content to track:

 

Conclusion

Cobalt Strike is a very malleable tool. This means that the indicators we have used here will not detect all instances of Cobalt Strike, with that being said, this is known common Cobalt Strike behaviour. This blog post was intended to showcase how the usage of the HTTP Lua options file can be imperative in identifying anomalous traffic in your environment whilst using real-world Live malware. The extraction of the HTTP headers, whilst a trivial piece of information, can be vital in detecting advanced tools used by attackers. This coupled with the extraction of the values themselves, can help your analysts to create more advanced higher fidelity content.

Preface
In order to prevent confusion, I wanted to add a little snippet before we jump into the analysis. The blog post
first goes over how the server became infected with Metasploit, it was using a remote execution CVE
against an Apache Tomcat Web Server, the details of which can be found here, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/
CVE-2019-0232. Further into the blog post, details of Metasploit can be seen.

 

This CVE requires that the CGI Servlet in Apache Tomcat is enabled. This is not an abnormal servlet to be
enabled and merely requires the Administrator to uncomment a few lines in the Tomcat web.xml. This is a
normal administrative action to have taken on the Web Server:

  


Now, if the administrator has a .bat, or .cmd file in the cgi-bin directory on the Apache Tomcat Server. The
attacker can remotely execute commands as Apache will call cmd.exe to execute the .bat or .cmd file and
incorrectly handle the parameters passed; this file can contain anything, as long as it executes. So here as an
example, we place a simple .bat file in the cgi-bin directory:

 

From a browser, the attacker can call the .bat file and pass a command to execute due to the way the CGI
Servlet handles this request and passes the arguments:

 

From here, the attacker can create a payload using msfvenom and instruct the web server to download the Metasploit payload they had created:

 

The Detection in NetWitness Packets

RCE Exploit
NetWitness Packets does a fantastic job pulling apart the behaviour of network traffic. This allows analysts to
detect attacks even with no prior knowledge of them. A fantastic meta value for analysts to look at is windows
cli admin commands, this metadata is created when cli commands are detected; grouping this metadata with inbound
traffic to your web servers is a great pivot point to start looking for malicious traffic:

 

NOTE: Taking advantage of the traffic_flow_options.lua parser would be highly beneficial for your SOC. This parser allows you to define your subnets and tag them with friendly names. Editing this to contain your web servers address space for example, would be a great idea.

 

Taking the above note into account, your analysts could then construct a query like the following:
(analysis.service = 'windows cli admin commands') && (direction = 'inbound') && (netname.dst = 'webservers')
Filtering on this metadata reduces the traffic quite significantly. From here, we can open up other meta
keys to get a better understanding of what traffic is related to these windows cli commands. From the below
screenshot, we can see that this is HTTP traffic, with a GET request to a hello.bat file in the /cgi-bin/ directory,
there are also some suspicious looking queries associated with it that appear to reference command line
arguments:

 

At this point, we decide to reconstruct the raw sessions themselves as we have some suspicions surrounding
this traffic to see exactly what these HTTP sessions are. Upon doing so, we can see a GET request with the
dir command, and we can also see the dir output in the response - this will be what the windows cli admin
commands metadata was picking up on:

 

This traffic instantly stands out as something of interest and as being something that requires further
investigation. In order to get a holistic view of all data toward this server, we need to reconstruct our query, as
the windows cli admin commands metadata would have only picked up on the sessions where it saw CLI
commands, we are, however, interested in seeing it all. So we look at the metadata available for this session
and build a new query. This now allows us to see other interesting metadata and get a better idea of what the
attacker was doing. Looking at the Query meta key, we can see all of the attackers commands:

 

Navigating to the Event Analysis view, we can see the commands in the order they took place and reconstruct
what the attacker was doing. From here we can see a sequence of events whereby the attacker makes a
directory, C:\temp, downloads an executable called 2.exe to said directory, and subsequently executes it:

 

MSF File and Traffic

As we can see the attackers commands, we can also see the download for an executable they performed, a.exe. This means we can run a query and extract that file from the packet data as well. We run a simple query looking for a.exe
and we find our session. Also, take note of the user agent, why is certutil being used to download a.exe? This is also a great indicator of something suspicious:

 

We can also choose to switch to the File Analysis view and download our file(s). This would allow us to perform additional analysis on the file(s) in question:

 

Merely running a strings on one of these files yields a result of a domain this executable may potentially connect to:

 

As we also have another hostname to add to our analysis, we can now perform a query on just this hostname
to see if there is any other interesting metadata associated with it. Opening the session analysis meta key, we can see a myriad of interesting pivot points. We can group these pivot points together, or make combinations of them to whittle down the traffic to something more manageable:

NOTE: See the RSA IR Hunting guide for more details on these metadata values: https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-62341

 

Once we have pivoted down using some of the metadata above, we start to get down to a more manageable amount of sessions - continuing looking at the service analysis meta key we also observe some additional pieces of metadata of interest we can use to start reconstructing the sessions to get a better understanding of what this traffic is:

 

  • long connection
  • http no referer
  • http six or less headers
  • http post missing content-type
  • http no user-agent
  • watchlist file fingerprint

 

 

Opening these sessions up in the Event Analysis view, we can see an HTTP POST with binary data, and a 200 OK from the supposed Apache Server, we can also see the directory is the same as we saw from our strings analysis:

 

Continuing to browse through these sessions, yields more of the same:

 

Navigating back to the investigate view, it is also possible to see that the directory is always the same and the one we saw in our strings analysis:

 

NOTE: During the analysis, no beaconing pattern was observed, this can make the C2 harder to detect and requires continued threat hunting from your analysts to understand your environment and pick up on these types of anomalies.

 

Web Shell

Now we know that the Apache Tomcat Web Server is infected, we can look at all other traffic
associated with the Web Server and continue to monitor to see if anything else takes place, attackers like to keep
multiple entry points if possible. Focusing on our Web Server, we can also see a JSP page being accessed
that sounds odd, error2.jsp, and observe some additional queries:

 

Pivoting into the Event Analysis view and reconstructing the sessions, we can see a tasklist command being
executed:

 

And the subsequent response of the tasklist output. This is a Web Shell that has been placed on the server and
the attacker is also using to execute commands:

 

NOTE: For more information on Web Shells, see the following series: https://community.rsa.com/community/products/netwitness/blog/2019/02/12/web-shells-and-netwitness

 

It is important to note that just because you have identified one method of remote access, it does not mean that
is the only one, it is important to ascertain whether or not other access methods were made available by the
attacker.

 

The Detection in NetWitness Endpoint
As I preach in every blog post, the analyst should always log in every morning and check the following
three meta keys as a priority, IOC (Indicators of Compromise), BOC (Behaviours of Compromise), and EOC
(Enablers of Compromise). Looking at these keys, a myriad of pieces of metadata stand out as great places to
start the investigation, but let's place a focus on these three for now:

 

Let's take the downloads binary using certutil to start, and pivot into the Event Analysis view. Here we
can see the certutil binary being used to download a variety of the executable we saw in the packet data:

 

Looking into one of the other behaviours of compromise, http daemon runs command shell, we can also
see evidence of the bat file being requested and the associated commands, as well as the use of the Web
Shell, error2.jsp. It is also important to note that there is a request for the hello.bat prior to the remote code
execution vulnerability being exploited, this would be seen as legitimate traffic given that the server is working
as designed for the CGI-BIN scripts. It is down to the analyst to review the traffic and decipher whether or not
something malicious is happening, or whether this is by design of the server:

 

NOTE: Due to the nature of how the Tomcat server handles the vulnerable cgi-bin application and "legitimate" JSP files, you can see hello.bat as part of the tracking event as it's an argument passed to cmd.exe. However, with the error2.jsp, it is executed inside the Tomcat process, and only when the web shell spawns a new command shell to execute certain commands will you see cmd.exe being executed, and not every time error2.jsp is used. Having said that, the advantage for the defender is that even if not all of it is tracked, or leaves a visible footprint, at some point something will, this will/ could be the starting thread needed to detect the intrusion.

 

Coming back to the Investigate view we can see another interesting piece of metadata that would be of interest, creates remote service - let's pivot on this and see what took place:

Here we can see that cmd was used to create a service on our Web Server that would run a malicious binary dropped by the attacker in the c:\temp directory:

 

It is important to remember that as a defender, you only need to pick up on one of these artifacts leftover from
the attacker in order to start unraveling their activity.

 

Conclusion
With today's ever-changing landscape, it is becoming increasingly inefficient to create signatures for known
vulnerabilities and attacks. It is therefore far more important to pick up on behaviours of traffic that stand out as
abnormal, than generating signatures. As shown in this blog post, a fairly recent remote code execution CVE
was exploited, https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0232 - no signatures were required to pick up on this
as NetWitness pulls apart the behaviours, we just had to follow the path. Similarly, with Metasploit it is also very difficult to generate effective long life signatures that could detect this C2; performing
threat hunting through the data based on a foundation of analysing behaviours, will ensure that all knowns and
unknowns are effectively analysed.

 

It is also important to note that the packet traffic would typically be encrypted but we kept it in the clear for the purposes of this post, with that being said, the RCE exploit and Web Shell is easily detectable when NetWitness Endpoint tracking data is being ingested, and this allows the defender to have the necessary visibility if SSL decryption is not in place.

Summary

A vulnerability exists within Remote Desktop Services and may be exploited by sending crafted network requests using RDP. The result could be remote code execution on a victim system without any user authentication or interaction. The vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708, is not known to have been publicly executed, however, expectations are that it will. Follow the Microsoft advisory to patch vulnerable systems -- CVE-2019-0708 | Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.

 

Live Content

The RSA Threat Content Team has added detection for NetWitness packet customers based on the work of the NCC Group. To get the detection, update your Decoders with the latest version of the RDP Lua parser (dated May 22nd, 2019).

 

If an exploit has been detected, meta will be output to the NetWitness Investigation page for

 

ioc = ‘possible CVE-2019-0708 exploit attempt’

 

You may also see the exploitation by deploying rules to the NetWitness ESA product and viewing the Respond workflow for alerts. Deploy the following rules from Live to ESA:

 

  • RDP Inbound
  • RDP from Same Source to Multiple Destinations

 

RDP Inbound may catch the initial connection from the attacker. It’s expected the infection would be worm-like moving to internally networked systems. In that case, the second rule, RDP from Same Source to Multiple Destinations, may catch the behavior. Please note you must be monitoring lateral traffic within your network for this detection.

 

References:

In 11.3 the same NWE Agent can operate in Insights (free) or Advanced Mode . This change can be made by toggling a policy configuration in the UI and does not require agent reinstall or reboot. 

There could be both Insights and Advanced agents in a single deployment. Only agents operating in Advanced mode are accounted for licensing.

 

Feature

Comments

Insights

Advanced

Operating Systems Support

Release

Windows

MacOS

Linux

Basic scans

Inventory

11.3

4.x

Tracking scans

Continuous file,network,process,thread monitors

Registry monitor(Specific to windows)

11.3

4.x

Anomaly detection

Inline hooks, kernel hooks,suspicious threads,registry discrepancies

11.3

4.x

Windows Log Collection

Collect Windows Event Logs

11.3**

Threat Detection Content

Detection Rules /Reports

11.3

Risk score

Based on Threat Content Pack

11.3

4.x

File Reputation Service

File Intel ( 3rd Party Lookup)

11.3

4.x

Live Connect

Community Intel

11.3

4.x

Analyze module

Analysis of downloaded file

11.3

4.x

Blocking

Block an executable

11.3

4.x

Agent Protection

Driver Registry Protection / User Mode Kill Protection

11.3**

Powershell , Command-line ( input)

Report user interactions within a console session

11.3**

Process Visualization

Unique identifier (VPID) for process that uniquely identifies the entire process event chain 

 

11.3**

MFT Analysis

Future

4.x

Process Memory Dump

Future

4.x

System Memory Dump

Future

4.x

Request File

Future

4.x

Automatic File Downloads

Future

4.x

Standalone Scans

Future

4.x

RAR

Future

4.x

Containment

Future

4.x

API Support

Future

4.x

Certificate CRL Validation

Future

4.x

 

** - New Capabilities , these do not exist in 4.x

 

 

11.3 Key Endpoint Features 

Feature
Value
Details
1Advanced Endpoint Agent

Full and Continuous Endpoint Visibility

Advanced Threat Detection / Threat Hunting

Performs both kernel and user level analysis

  • Tracks Behaviors such as process creation,remote thread creation,relevant registry key modifications,executable file

    creation, processes that read documents (refer doc for the detailed list)

  • Tracks Network Events

  • Tracks Console Events ( commands typed into console like cmd)
  • Windows Log Collection
  • Detects Anomalies such as Image hooks , Kernel Hooks , Suspicious Threads , Registry Discrepancies
  • Retrieves lists of drivers, processes, DLLs, files (executables), services, autoruns,
  • Host file entries, scheduled tasks
  • Gathers security information such as network share, patch level, Windows tasks,logged in Users,bash history
  • Reports the hashes (SHA-256, SHA-1, MD5) and file size of all binaries (executables, libraries (DLL and .SO)and scripts found on the system
  • Reports details on certificate,signer,file description,executable sections,imported libraries etc

2Threat Content PacksDetection of adversary tactics and techniques ( MITRE ATT&CK matrix)See attached 11.3 Endpoint Rules spreadsheet
3Risk Scoring

Prioritized List of Risky Hosts /Files

Automated Incident Creation for Hosts /Files when risk threshold exceeds

Risk Score backed up with context of contributing factors

Rapid/Easy Investigation Workflow

Risk Scores are computed based on a proprietary scoring algorithm developed by RSA's Data Sciences team

The Scoring server considers takes multiple factors into consideration for scoring

  • Critical , high ,medium indicators generated by the endpoints based on the threat content packs deployed
  • Reputation status of files - Malicious / Suspicious
  • Bias status of file - Blacklisted /Greylisted /Whitelisted
4Process Visualizations

Provides a visualization of a process and its parent-child relationships

Timeline of all activities related to a process

 

5

File Analysis/Reputation/Bias Status

Categorize Files

Saves Analysis time , Filter Out Noise , Focus on Real threats

File hashes from the environment are sent to RSA Threat Intel Cloud for reputation status updates

Live connect Lookup in Investigations

6Response Actions - File BlockingAccelerate Response /Prevent Malware ExecutionBlocks File Hash across the environment
7Response Actions - Retrieve Files

Download and Analyze File Contents for Anomalies

Static Analysis using 3rd Party Tools

8Centralized Group Policy Management

Agent Configurations Updated Dynamically Based on Group Membership

Groups can be created based on different criteria such as IP Address,Host names,Operating System Type,Operating Description

Endpoint Policies such as Agent Mode ,Scan Schedule , Server Settings , Response Actions can be automatically pushed based on group membership

Agents can be migrated to different Endpoint Servers based on Group/Policy Assignment

9Geo Distributed Scalable DeploymentConsolidated view & management of endpoints /files and the associated risk across distributed deployments

Strides have been made in RSA NetWitness Platform v11.2 to provide an administrator alternatives to the standard proprietary NW database format. Now an admin can choose to have the raw packet database files written in PcapNg format allowing them to be directly accessible using third party tools like Wireshark.

 

To enable storing the raw packet data as PcapNg files, the setting packet.file.type in the network decoder database configuration node has to be changed from netwitness to pcapng. After making this change a restart of the service is not required unless you are too impatient for the existing database file (default size is 4GB) to roll-over.

 

PcapNg configuration

 

Once the change is applied any new PCAPs uploaded or network traffic ingested into the decoder will be stored as pcapng files. Now as the database files age they are more readily available while on the decoder and when backed up off the system. In the below image you can see a mixture of the formats commingling in the packet database folder. The database written format can be changed between the two options without any loss of standard functionality.

 

pcapng files

 

There are some considerations before making the switch to PcapNg format over the default nwpdb format. The PcapNg format requires approximately 5% more storage when compared to the nwpdb format. The PcapNg format is not recommended to be used when ingest rates are greater than 8 Gbps on a single decoder as can introduce approximately 5% packet drops compared to when nwpdb is in use. The PcapNg files cannot be compressed while nwpdb files can, although in general raw network data typically does not compress well compared to raw logs. The PcapNg format is an open format while the nwpdb files are in a proprietary format so as accessibility improves, privacy concerns may arise when storing as PcapNg files. However, I am not suggesting security through obscurity is the right answer when measuring your GDPR compliance.

 

Hopefully this along with the already available SDK and APIs make NetWitness data more accessible.

One of the more common requests and "how do I" questions I've heard in recent months centers around the Emails that the Respond Module can send when an Incident is created or updated.  Enabling this configuration is simple (https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-86405), but unfortunately changing the templates that Respond uses when it sends one of these emails has not been an option.

 

Or rather...has not been an accessible option.  I aim to fix that with this blog post.

 

Before getting into the weeds, I should note that this guide does not cover how to include *any* alert data within incident notification emails. The fields I have found in my tests that can be included are limited to these using JSON dot notation (e.g. "incident.id", "incident.title", "incident.summary", etc.):

 

Now, this does not necessarily mean it isn't possible to include other data, just that I have not figured out how...yet.

 

The first thing we need to do is create a new Notification Template for Respond to use.  We do this within the UI at Admin / System / Global Notifications --> Templates tab.  I recommend using either of the existing Respond Notification templates as a base, and then modifying either/both of those as necessary. (I have attached these OOTB notification templates to this blog.)

 

For this guide, I'll use the "incident-created" template as my base, and copy that into a new Notification Template in the UI.  I give my template an easy-to-remember name, choose any of the default Template Types from the dropdown - it does not matter which I choose, as it won't have any bearing on the process, but it's a required field and I won't be able to save the template without selecting one - and write in a description:

 

Then I copy the contents of the "incident-created" template into the Template field.  The first ~60% of this template is just formatting and comments, so I scroll past all that until I find the start of the HTML <body> tag.  This is where I'll be making my changes

 

One of the more useful changes that comes to mind here is to include a hyperlink in the email that will allow me to pivot directly from the email to the Incident in NetWitness.  I can also change any of the static text to whatever fits my needs.  Once I'm done making my changes, I save the template.

 

After this, I'm done in the UI (unless I decide to make additional changes to my template), and open a SSH session to the NetWitness Admin Server.  To make this next part as simple and straightforward as I can, I've written a script that will prompt me for the name of the Template I just created, use that to make a new Respond Notification template, and then prompt me one more time to choose which Respond Notification event (Created or Updated) I want to apply it to. (The script is attached to this blog.)

 

A couple notes on running the script:

  1. Must be run from the Admin Server
  2. Must be run as a superuser

 

Running the script:

 

...after a wall of text because my template is fairly long...I get a prompt to choose Created or Updated:

 

And that's it!  Now, when a new incident gets created (either manually or automatically) Respond sends me an email using my custom Notification Template:

 

And if I want to update or fix or modify it in any way, I simply make my changes to the template within the UI and then run this script again.

 

Happy customizing.

Hi Everyone,

We're excited to share our second issue of the RSA NetWitness Platform newsletter with you.  As a friendly reminder, the goal for this newsletter is to share more information about what is happening and what key things you should be aware of regarding our products and services.

 

This is a monthly newsletter, so you can expect the next newsletter in early June.  If you have any specific topics you would like to see in a future newsletter, please let us know!

 

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