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A vulnerability exists within Remote Desktop Services and may be exploited by sending crafted network requests using RDP. The result could be remote code execution on a victim system without any user authentication or interaction. The vulnerability, CVE-2019-0708, is not known to have been publicly executed, however, expectations are that it will. Follow the Microsoft advisory to patch vulnerable systems -- CVE-2019-0708 | Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.


Live Content

The RSA Threat Content Team has added detection for NetWitness packet customers based on the work of the NCC Group. To get the detection, update your Decoders with the latest version of the RDP Lua parser (dated May 22nd, 2019).


If an exploit has been detected, meta will be output to the NetWitness Investigation page for


ioc = ‘possible CVE-2019-0708 exploit attempt’


You may also see the exploitation by deploying rules to the NetWitness ESA product and viewing the Respond workflow for alerts. Deploy the following rules from Live to ESA:


  • RDP Inbound
  • RDP from Same Source to Multiple Destinations


RDP Inbound may catch the initial connection from the attacker. It’s expected the infection would be worm-like moving to internally networked systems. In that case, the second rule, RDP from Same Source to Multiple Destinations, may catch the behavior. Please note you must be monitoring lateral traffic within your network for this detection.



The RSA Live Content team has released the Traffic Flow LUA and associated options parsers.  The traffic flow parser brings directionality information and netblock identification into the product, which exist as part of the IR content pack.  Directionality (direction meta) provides the context of whether a session was initiated from an internal host to an external host (outbound), from an external host to an internal host (inbound), or was between two internal hosts (lateral). The netblock name (netname meta) provides the context of where on your network a host resides.  By default, netblocks are defined for private, broadcast, loopback, link-local, multicast, and reserved traffic.  The screenshot below shows the Investigation view of these two pieces of meta being populated.



You download the parser from Live to deploy to a packet decoder, in the same manner as you download and deploy all of the RSA parsers. In addition to the parser, there is an options file. You only need the options file if the default settings are not sufficient for your use case. 




At this time, only manual deployment to a Log Decoder is supported.  You can find detailed information about the current implementation in SA docs, at Traffic Flow Lua Parser


What to expect going forward?

Our goal going forward is to make the parser easier to deploy and configure.  It is expected in upcoming releases:

  • Ease of customization and deployment across multiple devices
  • Support for Log Decoders via Live

Lateral movement is a part of the kill chain. After an attack has taken place, which allows entry into a company’s internal environment, lateral movement is the process of elevating credentials and gaining access to additional internal systems. This document describes a package of content that contains a set of rules to monitor Windows systems for lateral movement.


A vulnerability in the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) version 1 (v1) and IKE version 2 (v2) code of Cisco ASA Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a reload of the affected system or to remotely execute code.


This is registered as CVE-2016-1287.  See the Cisco Security Advisory for additional information


Live Content

There are two pieces of content in Live, which identify events within SA that potentially warrant further investigation.

  1. LUA Parser (packets):  ISAKMP
  2. Application Rule (logs):  Cisco ASA Software IKEv1 and IKEv2 Buffer Overflow



For packet-based customers, this LUA parser identifies ISAKMP.    For IKE type 132 (fragment) payloads, an alert is registered if the length field is less than 8, which indicates an attempt to exploit Cisco ASA Buffer Overflow CVE-2016-1287.  ISAKMP sessions on ports other than UDP 500 or 4500 will not be parsed.


Parser Details:



          * FeedParser

          * NETWORK


          * alertids_warning




     * - mapped to risk meta

     * service - '500'



          * isakmp buffer overflow


Cisco ASA Software IKEv1 and IKEv2 Buffer Overflow Application Rule

Customers who deploy either Cisco IPS or SourceFire Defense Center may benefit from this log-based Application Rule written to detect indicators to CVE-2016-1287: Cisco ASA Software IKEv1 and IKEv2 Buffer Overflow.


SourceFire signature IDs utilized to detect this vulnerability are '1:36903' and '1:37674' while Cisco IPS signature IDs are 7169-0 and 7169-1.


Rule Logic:

Rule Name: nw125025

Condition:  device.type='snort','ciscoidsxml' &&'"SERVER-OTHER Cisco ASA IKEv1 invalid fragment length heap buffer overflow attempt"', '"SERVER-OTHER Cisco ASA IKEv2 invalid fragment length heap buffer overflow attempt"', 'Cisco ASA Software IKEv1 and IKEv2 Buffer Overflow'

Alert On:




Rule Details:


          risk.warning - Cisco ASA Software IKEv1 and IKEv2 Buffer Overflow







Customer  Content

Since a result of the vulnerability is a large increase in ISAKMP sessions utilizing UDP port 500 or 4500, a Correlation Rule or ESA rule could be created to detect traffic over a threshold typical within the customer environment.


The rule should be tailored to the customer environment:

  1. Condition ‘device.type='ciscoasa' && ip.dstport=500’ is added to detect logs with Cisco ASA enabled.  Remove if not needed or update to allow for ip.dstport 4500 if applies to environment
  2. Default threshold is a single ip.src generating traffic to greater than 200 unique ip.dst.   Customize the threshold for the customer environment


Sample Basic Correlation Rule


Rule Name:  Cisco ASA Buffer Overflow Vulnerability

Condition:  medium=32 && device.type='ciscoasa' && ip.dstport=500

Threshold:  u_count(ip.dst)>200

Instance Key:  ip.src

Time Window:  5 minutes




Sample ESA Rule

Create an Advanced ESA rule and copy and paste the following.  Be sure to customize for the environment as described above.


The @Hint to reclaim groups should match in seconds the total time set for the window.






medium=32 AND device_type='ciscoasa' AND ip_dstport=500

).std:groupwin(ip_src).win:time_length_batch(5 minutes, 200).std:unique(ip_dst)

GROUP BY ip_src

HAVING COUNT(*) = 200;

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