



**RSA**

**RSA<sup>®</sup> Authentication Manager 8.5  
Security Configuration Guide**

## **Contact Information**

RSA Link at <https://community.rsa.com> contains a knowledgebase that answers common questions and provides solutions to known problems, product documentation, community discussions, and case management.

## **Trademarks**

Dell, RSA, the RSA Logo, EMC and other trademarks, are trademarks of Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. Other trademarks may be trademarks of their respective owners. For a list of RSA trademarks, go to [www.emc.com/legal/emc-corporation-trademarks.htm#rsa](http://www.emc.com/legal/emc-corporation-trademarks.htm#rsa).

## **License Agreement**

This software and the associated documentation are proprietary and confidential to Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries and are furnished under license, and may be used and copied only in accordance with the terms of such license and with the inclusion of the copyright notice below. This software and the documentation, and any copies thereof, may not be provided or otherwise made available to any other person.

No title to or ownership of the software or documentation or any intellectual property rights thereto is hereby transferred. Any unauthorized use or reproduction of this software and the documentation may be subject to civil and/or criminal liability.

This software is subject to change without notice and should not be construed as a commitment by Dell Inc.

## **Third-Party Licenses**

This product may include software developed by parties other than RSA. The text of the license agreements applicable to third-party software in this product may be viewed on the product documentation page on RSA Link. By using this product, a user of this product agrees to be fully bound by terms of the license agreements.

## **Note on Encryption Technologies**

This product may contain encryption technology. Many countries prohibit or restrict the use, import, or export of encryption technologies, and current use, import, and export regulations should be followed when using, importing or exporting this product.

## **Distribution**

Use, copying, and distribution of any Dell software described in this publication requires an applicable software license.

Dell Inc. believes the information in this publication is accurate as of its publication date. The information is subject to change without notice.

THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION IS PROVIDED "AS IS." DELL INC. MAKES NO REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO THE INFORMATION IN THIS PUBLICATION, AND SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Copyright © 1994-2020 Dell Inc. or its subsidiaries. All Rights Reserved.

July 2020

# Contents

<b>Preface</b> .....	<b>7</b>
About This Guide .....	7
RSA SecurID Access Support and Service .....	7
Support for RSA Authentication Manager .....	7
Support for the Cloud Authentication Service and Identity Routers .....	7
RSA Ready Partner Program .....	8
<b>Chapter 1: Security Configuration</b> .....	<b>9</b>
Security Configuration Overview .....	10
Access Control Settings .....	10
User Authentication .....	10
User Authorization .....	10
Component Access Control .....	10
System Administrator Accounts .....	11
Authentication Manager Administrator Accounts .....	11
Appliance Operating System Account .....	12
Super Admin Restoration .....	12
Change an Operations Console Administrator's Password .....	13
Password Policies .....	13
Configuring Administrative Role Scope and Permissions .....	14
Token Protection .....	15
Tokencode Tokens (No PIN Required) .....	15
Token File Protection .....	16
Token Serial Number Masking in Log Messages .....	16
Hardware Token Distribution .....	16
Software Token Distribution .....	17
Dynamic Seed Provisioning for Software Token Delivery .....	17
On-Demand Authentication Tokencode Delivery .....	17
Lost Tokens .....	18
Software Development Kit .....	18
Monitoring & Auditing .....	18
Policies and Roles .....	18

Monitoring Authentication Manager .....	18
Log Messages .....	19
Log Types .....	19
Logging Levels .....	19
Real-Time Log Monitoring .....	20
Appliance Logs .....	20
Best Practices for Custom Reports .....	20
Communication Security .....	21
Port Usage .....	21
SMTP Encryption .....	21
Data Security .....	21
<b>Chapter 2: Secure Deployment and Usage .....</b>	<b>23</b>
Secure Appliance Deployment .....	24
Web Tier Deployment .....	25
Self-Service Console Hardening .....	25
Network Infrastructure Hardening .....	25
Firewalls .....	26
Protecting Sensitive Files .....	26
External Identity Sources .....	27
Agents .....	27
Suggested Security Practices for an Amazon Web Services Virtual Environment .....	29
Suggested Security Practices for an Azure Virtual Environment .....	30
Suggested Security Practices for a VMware Virtual Environment .....	30
Suggested Security Practices for a Hyper-V Virtual Environment .....	31
System Hardening .....	32
BIOS Hardening .....	33
Command Line Privileges .....	33
NFS Server and Windows Share Security .....	33
RSA Authentication Manager Services That Start Automatically .....	34
<b>Chapter 3: Secure Maintenance .....</b>	<b>35</b>
RSA Authentication Manager Updates .....	36
Operating System Access .....	36
Run Clam Antivirus Software .....	37

Protecting Backups .....	38
<b>Chapter 4: Physical Security Controls .....</b>	<b>39</b>
Protecting the Authentication Manager Environment .....	40
Physical Security Controls .....	40
Remote Access to Server Environments .....	40
<b>Chapter 5: Supporting End Users .....</b>	<b>43</b>
Procedures and Training .....	44
Preventing Social Engineering Attacks .....	44
Confirming a User's Identity .....	44
PIN Management .....	45
Advice for Users .....	46
Emergency Access and Static Tokencodes .....	47



# Preface

## About This Guide

---

This guide is intended to help identify configuration options and best practices designed to help ensure correct operation of RSA<sup>®</sup> Authentication Manager 8.5, and to offer maintenance recommendations. However, it is up to you to ensure the products are properly monitored and maintained and to develop appropriate corporate policies regarding administrator access and auditing.

When deploying software tokens, use this guide in conjunction with your software token documentation and the *RSA SecurID Software Token Best Practices Guide*.

In addition to the recommendations in this guide, RSA strongly recommends that you follow industry best practices for hardening the network infrastructure, such as applying the latest Authentication Manager product updates, segmenting your network, and monitoring your network for intrusions.

For a complete list of documentation, see "RSA SecurID Access Product Documentation" on RSA Link at <https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-60094>.

For a description of common RSA Authentication Manager terms, see the "RSA Authentication Manager Glossary" on RSA Link at <https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-76682>.

## RSA SecurID Access Support and Service

---

You can access community and support information on RSA Link at <https://community.rsa.com>. RSA Link contains a knowledgebase that answers common questions and provides solutions to known problems, product documentation, community discussions, and case management.

### Support for RSA Authentication Manager

Before you call Customer Support for help with the RSA Authentication Manager appliance, have the following information available:

- Access to the RSA Authentication Manager appliance.
- Your license serial number. To find this number, do one of the following:
  - Look at the order confirmation e-mail that you received when you ordered the product. This e-mail contains the license serial number.
  - Log on to the Security Console, and click **License Status**. Click **View Installed License**.
- The appliance software version. This information is located in the top, right corner of the Quick Setup, or you can log on to the Security Console and click **Software Version Information**.

### Support for the Cloud Authentication Service and Identity Routers

If your company has deployed identity routers and uses the Cloud Authentication Service, RSA provides you with a unique identifier called the Customer Support ID. This is required when you register with RSA Customer Support. To see your Customer Support ID, sign in to the Cloud Administration Console and click **My Account > Company Settings**.

## **RSA Ready Partner Program**

---

The RSA Ready Partner Program website at [www.rsaready.com](http://www.rsaready.com) provides information about third-party hardware and software products that have been certified to work with RSA products. The website includes Implementation Guides with step-by-step instructions and other information on how RSA products work with third-party products.

# Chapter 1: Security Configuration

Security Configuration Overview .....	10
Access Control Settings .....	10
System Administrator Accounts .....	11
Password Policies .....	13
Configuring Administrative Role Scope and Permissions .....	14
Token Protection .....	15
Software Development Kit .....	18
Monitoring & Auditing .....	18
Log Messages .....	19
Real-Time Log Monitoring .....	20
Appliance Logs .....	20
Best Practices for Custom Reports .....	20
Communication Security .....	21
Data Security .....	21

## Security Configuration Overview

---

This chapter provides an overview of the settings available in RSA Authentication Manager to ensure secure operation of the product. Security settings consist of:

[Access Control Settings below](#). Limit access by end user or by external product components

[Monitoring & Auditing on page 18](#). Settings related to the logging of events

[Communication Security on page 21](#). Security for Authentication Manager network communications

[Data Security on page 21](#). Helps ensure protection of the data handled by Authentication Manager.

## Access Control Settings

---

Access control settings consist of:

- [User Authentication below](#)
- [User Authorization below](#)
- [Component Access Control below](#)

### User Authentication

The following user authentication settings control the process of verifying a user's identity when the user attempts to access Authentication Manager:

**Default Accounts.** For a list of the default appliance accounts, see [System Administrator Accounts on the facing page](#).

**Authentication Configuration.** The Super Admin account controls the initial administrative access to the Security Console. The Super Admin user creates additional administrator accounts and designates the allowable authentication methods for those accounts.

### User Authorization

Authenticated administrators configure all permissions through the Security Console. For more information on permissions, see the chapter "Preparing RSA Authentication Manager for Administration" in the *RSA Authentication Manager Administrator's Guide*.

You can deploy a custom logon banner that displays before administrators or users access Authentication Manager. The logon banner is often used for legal reasons, for example, to warn users that only authorized personnel have permission to access the system. For more information, see the Help topic "Custom Logon Banners".

### Component Access Control

These component access control settings define control over access to the product by external and internal systems or components:

**Component Authentication.** Administrators cannot configure authentication between the components of RSA Authentication Manager.

**Component Authorization.** With the exception of enabling replica instances or a web tier, administrators cannot configure authorization of or restrict access to components of Authentication Manager. Authorization and access restrictions are set to default methods that cannot be changed.

## System Administrator Accounts

---

The following accounts provide permission to modify, maintain, and repair the Authentication Manager deployment. Quick Setup creates these accounts with information that you enter.

- [Authentication Manager Administrator Accounts below](#)
- [Appliance Operating System Account on the next page](#)

If you plan to record the logon credentials for these accounts, be sure that the storage method and location are secure.

### Authentication Manager Administrator Accounts

The following table lists the administrator accounts for Authentication Manager. The administrator who deploys the primary instance creates these accounts during Quick Setup.

Name	Permissions	Management
Super Admin	Super Admins can perform all administrative tasks in the Security Console with full administrative permission in all security domains in the deployment.	Any Super Admin can create other Super Admin users in the Security Console.  An Operations Console administrator can recover a Super Admin account if no Super Admin can access the system.
Operations Console administrator	Operations Console administrators can perform administrative tasks in the Operations Console. Operations Console administrators also use command line utilities to perform some procedures, such as recovering the Super Admin account. Command line utilities require the appliance operating system account password.  <b>Note:</b> Some tasks in the Operations Console also require Super Admin credentials. Only Super Admins whose records are stored in the internal database are accepted by the Operations Console.	Any Super Admin can create and manage Operations Console administrators in the Security Console. For example, you cannot recover a lost Operations Console administrator password, but a Super Admin can create a new one.  Operations Console administrator accounts are stored outside of the Authentication Manager internal database. This ensures that if the database becomes unreachable, an Operations Console administrator can still access the Operations Console and command line utilities.

User IDs for a Super Admin and a non-administrative user are validated in the same way. A valid User ID must be a unique identifier that uses 1 to 255 ASCII characters.

A valid User ID for an Operations Console administrator must be a unique identifier that uses 1 to 255 ASCII characters. The characters @ ~ are not allowed, and spaces are not allowed.

RSA recommends the following best practices for administrative accounts:

- Create a separate administrative account for each administrator, for example, create a separate Operations Console administrator account for each Operations Console user. Do not share account information, especially passwords, among multiple administrators.
- RSA does not recommend associating administrative roles with external LDAP or Active Directory user accounts. Use separate administrative accounts with their own credentials for external identity source administrators and Authentication Manager administrators.
- If you have multiple administrators, restrict the scope and permissions of Authentication Manager administrative accounts, and restrict access by dividing your deployment into security domains. Separation of privileges is especially important if you are using LDAP or Active Directory users as administrators.
- If administrative roles in Authentication Manager are associated with an external LDAP account, a specific role, with appropriate limiting controls, should be used. For instructions, see [Configuring Administrative Role Scope and Permissions on page 14](#).

## Appliance Operating System Account

The appliance operating system account User ID is `rsaadmin`. This User ID cannot be changed. You specify the operating system account password during Quick Setup. You use this account to access the operating system when you perform advanced maintenance or troubleshooting tasks. The `rsaadmin` account is a privileged account to which access should be strictly limited and audited. Individuals who know the `rsaadmin` password and who are logged on as `rsaadmin` have `sudo` privileges and shell access.

Every appliance also has a root user account. This account is not needed for normal tasks. You cannot use this account to log on to the appliance.

You can access the operating system with Secure Shell (SSH) on a hardware appliance or a virtual appliance. Before you can access the appliance operating system through SSH, you must use the Operations Console to enable SSH on the appliance.

On a VMware virtual appliance, you can also use the VMware vSphere Client. On a Hyper-V virtual appliance, you can also use the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager Console, or the Hyper-V Manager.

An Operations Console administrator can change the `rsaadmin` password. RSA does not provide a utility to recover the operating system password.

For more information, see the Help topics “Enable Secure Shell on the Appliance” and “Change the Operating System Account Password.”

## Super Admin Restoration

Your deployment must have at least one Super Admin. Only a Super Admin can perform certain critical tasks:

- Delegate roles to all other administrators.
- Create the security domain hierarchy.

RSA recommends that you assign the Super Admin role to only the most trusted administrators.

You need to restore a Super Admin if any of the following conditions exist:

- The sole Super Admin has been deleted from the deployment.
- No users have been assigned the Super Admin role.
- The sole Super Admin has been locked out.

If a Super Admin has been locked out, recovery can occur in any of the following ways:

- Another Super Admin can manually unlock the Super Admin.
- If the lockout policy that applies to the Super Admin allows auto-unlock, you can wait for lockout to expire.
- If the previous methods fail, use the Super Admin Restoration utility, `restore-admin`, to create a new Super Admin. For instructions, see “Restore the Super Admin” in the chapter “Advanced Administration” in the *RSA Authentication Manager Administrator's Guide*.

## Change an Operations Console Administrator's Password

Any Super Admin can change an Operations Console administrator password in the Security Console. You cannot recover a lost Operations Console administrator password, but a Super Admin can create a new one.

### Before you begin

You must be a Super Admin.

### Procedure

1. In the Security Console, click **Administration > Manage OC Administrators**.
2. Next to the Operations Console administrator whose password you wish to modify, click **Change Password**.
3. In the **Create New Password** field, enter the Operations Console administrator's new password. The password must be between 8 and 32 characters, contain at least 1 alphabetic character, at least 1 special character, and may only contain characters in the basic ASCII character set, excluding space, @, and ~. The password may not match the corresponding user ID.
4. In the **Confirm New Password** field, reenter the new password.
5. Click **Save**.

---

**Note:** It can take from fifteen to thirty minutes for changes to an Operations Console administrator's account to replicate to a replica instance.

---

## Password Policies

---

To enforce strong passwords, which will help secure sessions, RSA strongly recommends that you configure all password policies to meet the following minimum requirements:

- Minimum Password Length: 15 Characters
- Alpha Characters Required: 2 Characters
- Numeric Characters Required: 1 Character
- Special Characters Required: 1 Character
- Users cannot use the following characters: space / ; : ,
- Uppercase Characters Required: 1 Character
- Lowercase Characters Required: 1 Characters
- Password Change Interval: 90 Days
- Previous Passwords Disallowed: 20 Passwords
- Maximum Failed Login Attempts: 3 Attempts

## Configuring Administrative Role Scope and Permissions

---

The pre-defined administrative roles configured as part of Authentication Manager setup have scope over the top-level security domain by default. As a result, it is possible for administrators who are assigned one of these pre-defined roles to modify the account of a Super Admin, because the initial Super Admin account resides in the top-level security domain as well. This is because the top-level security domain is the only security domain in the system when Authentication Manager is initially set up.

Before assigning a pre-defined role to an administrator, consider whether you want to maintain the default behavior, or if you want to restrict the scope of the administrators assigned these roles to a lower-level security domain, one that does not include Super Admins or other higher-privileged administrators. There may be situations in which you want a lower-privileged administrator to modify the account of a higher-privileged administrator.

For existing deployments, you can use the Security Console to audit the permissions available to an administrator. For instructions, see the Help topic "View Available Permissions of an Administrator."

If you do not want the system to use the default scope of the pre-defined administrative roles, you can avoid unintentionally granting additional privileges to an administrator by doing one of the following:

- Make sure that the scope of the administrator does not include the following:
  - A security domain that contains the user account or token of a higher-privileged administrator.
  - The security domain that contains the administrator's own token so that the administrator cannot modify his own token or other credentials to provide additional privileges to his account.
  - The administrator's own security domain so that the administrator cannot modify his own account.
- Create separate security domains to enforce your intended administrative scopes. For example, create one for Super Admins, one for other administrators and one for users with no administrative role. Reduce the scope of the lower-privileged administrators to the security domains of users with no administrative role.

Configure Authentication Manager according the following model:

- Create a distinct security domain for Super Admins.
- Place all other administrators, including those who have permission to edit users or authentication credentials, in lower-level domains.
- Place all other users in another security domain.
- Assign the appropriate role and scope to administrators. Make the lower-privileged administrator's scope include only the security domain over which the administrator has authority. For example, make sure that the Help Desk administrator has scope only for the security domain of end users, and not for his own security domain or the security domain of the Super Admin. For instructions, see the Help topic, "Change the Scope of an Administrative Role."

If you do want to allow administrators to manage the accounts of higher-privileged administrators, there are a number of ways you can configure your system to do this.

- Make sure that the lower-privileged administrator does not have permission to edit the following account settings of the higher-privileged administrator, by removing permissions from the lower level account to edit authentication data of the higher level account, such as:

- The credential that is required to authenticate to the Security Console, for example, the user password of a Super Admin
- Security questions
- LDAP password
- RSA Password
- Assigned SecurID tokens
- The ability to administer other users, including the ability to clear PINs, assign SecurID tokens and enable on-demand authentication

---

**Note:** Make sure that the administrative role assigned to the administrator does not include tasks that are not required for the administrator to perform his job. For more information, see the Help topic, "Edit Permissions for an Administrative Role."

---

- If you do not use the RSA Self-Service console or risk-based authentication in your deployment, do the following:
  - Remove the Reset Password permission from the Help Desk administrator who is helping end users.
  - Assign the Assign Token and Reset Password permissions to an administrator other than the Help Desk administrator.
- Configure Authentication Manager to require a combination of authentication credentials. If Authentication Manager requires multiple credentials, for example an on-demand tokencode and a password, at least one of which the lower-privileged administrator does not have permission to edit, the lower-privileged administrator cannot fully control the higher-privileged administrator's authentication credentials and authenticate to the Security Console or Operations Console as the higher level administrator.

## Token Protection

---

Importing new tokens and distributing tokens to users are sensitive operations and if not done properly could expose an organization to security risks. The following sections contain recommendations designed to minimize risk during these sensitive operations.

---

**Note:** RSA strongly recommends that you do not assign more than one hardware token to a user as this may increase the likelihood that users will report a lost or stolen token.

---

### Tokencode Tokens (No PIN Required)

If you use RSA SecurID tokens that do not require a PIN (also known as Tokencode tokens), you should ensure that a second authentication factor, such as a Windows password, is required to authenticate to protected systems.

---

**Note:** If the deployment does not have a second factor and one cannot be implemented, RSA strongly recommends switching your RSA SecurID tokens to require a PIN. If you cannot switch all tokens to require a PIN, RSA strongly recommends regularly auditing agents on systems that do not require a second authentication factor for token users without a PIN.

---

Implement help desk procedures that ensure that administrators:

- Allow a user to authenticate with a Tokencode token only when the user requires access to systems that enforce an additional authentication factor.

- Allow a user to authenticate with a Tokencode token only when a second authentication factor is required on every resource the user may access.
- Flag groups that contain users with Tokencode tokens to ensure that these groups are enabled only on agents that protect resources that require a second authentication factor.

RSA strongly recommends that the audit trails of the following administrative activities be carefully monitored:

- Agent creation
- Group creation and assignment
- Group membership changes
- Token assignment
- Tokencode token enablement

## Token File Protection

RSA Manufacturing or certified partners deliver token files for import into your deployments. These files enable the use of strong authentication, and they contain sensitive information about tokens. RSA strongly recommends the following best practices:

- Limit access to these files to individuals responsible for importing tokens into RSA Authentication Manager.
- Store encrypted backup copies of token XML files in a secure location with no network connectivity.
- Files used for the import operation should be permanently deleted from the file system after the import operation is complete. If you use multiple systems as temporary storage locations, immediately delete the token files from the temporary locations as soon as you import the files.
- Secure any media used to deliver token information to you.

## Token Serial Number Masking in Log Messages

RSA strongly recommends that you implement token serial number masking to enhance protection of token serial numbers.

Token serial number masking is designed to allow you to mask part of the token serial number in log data that is sent over the network. This capability helps ensure that any log data sent in the clear over a non-secured network follows RSA Authentication Manager best practices. You can configure how many token serial number digits to display in the log message. Masked digits display as the 'x' character. The masked digits are always at the beginning of the serial number, while the exposed digits are always at the end. For example, if you configure token serial number masking to include 4 digits, the number displays as xxxxxxxx7056.

For instructions, see the Help topic "Mask Token Serial Numbers in Logs."

## Hardware Token Distribution

Take the following steps to protect hardware tokens during distribution:

- Distribute hardware tokens in a disabled state.
- Before enabling a token, Help Desk administrators should confirm the user's identity. For example, ask the user one or more questions to which only he or she knows the answer.
- Do not record the user's serial number outside the Authentication Manager server.

See [Preventing Social Engineering Attacks on page 44](#).

## Software Token Distribution

RSA strongly recommends that you take the following steps to protect software tokens during distribution:

- When generating the token related information (for example, files or CTF codes) for distribution, protect the files with a password, which encrypts the file. Use passwords that conform to best practices. For more information, see [Password Policies on page 13](#).
- Use the RSA Security Console to bind software tokens to device IDs when issuing software tokens. This limits the installation of tokens to only those machines that match the binding information. For more information, see the Help topic "Add a Software Token Profile".
- RSA recommends that you use dynamic seed provisioning to distribute software tokens. For more information, see [Dynamic Seed Provisioning for Software Token Delivery below](#).

## Dynamic Seed Provisioning for Software Token Delivery

Dynamic seed provisioning is a client-server protocol that enables secure, rapid setup of software tokens. A feature of RSA Authentication Manager, dynamic seed provisioning uses the industry-standard Cryptographic Token Key Initialization Protocol (CT-KIP).

Dynamic seed provisioning eliminates the need for a token distribution file. Instead, the software token application running on the device (the client) and Authentication Manager (the server) use a four-pass CT-KIP protocol to exchange information that is used to dynamically generate a unique seed on the client and the server. For increased security, use dynamic seed provisioning if you provision software tokens with RSA Authentication Manager because the CT-KIP process is engineered to prevent the potential interception of the token's seed.

After you complete the software token provisioning steps, Authentication Manager displays the URL link of the CT-KIP server and a unique, one-time token activation code. You need these two pieces of information to deliver the token to a device as a URL.

Decide how to safely deliver the URL link of the CT-KIP server and the CT-KIP activation code to users. RSA Authentication Manager does not encrypt e-mail. For secure delivery, you can do the following:

- Provide the user with a QR Code that encapsulates the CT-KIP URL and activation code. Scanning the QR Code in the Self-Service Console imports and activates the token.
- Provide the information offline, such as by calling the users on the telephone.
- Copy the information into e-mail that you encrypt.
- Use a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) e-mail encryption gateway if the end-user device supports encrypted e-mail.

For more information, see the Help topic "Software Token Distribution".

## On-Demand Authentication Tokencode Delivery

On-demand authentication (ODA) delivers a one-time tokencode to a user's mobile phone or e-mail account. ODA is easy to deploy because it does not require extra hardware, such as physical tokens. Employees already have and use mobile phones and e-mail accounts.

To increase security when you enable on-demand authentication (ODA) tokencodes for a user, follow these guidelines:

- Help Desk administrators should confirm the user's identity. For example, ask the user one or more questions to which only he or she knows the answer.

- Ensure that ODA tokencodes expire within a short period of time. Configure as short a period of time as your organization needs. RSA strongly recommends that this be no more than 15 minutes.
- Users should be trained to use ODA tokencodes immediately when they receive them.

## Lost Tokens

A lost token can be an RSA SecurID hardware authenticator or a software token on a user's mobile phone. When a user reports a lost token, RSA strongly recommends that Help Desk Administrators perform the following steps:

- Confirm the user's identity. For example, ask the user one or more questions to which only he or she knows the answer.
- Ask the user when they lost the token.
- Disable the token.
- Make note of the date and audit your logs for authentication attempts with the lost token until the token is recovered.
- Follow your organization's security policy to address any suspicious authentication attempts.

## Software Development Kit

---

When using the Software Development Kit, RSA strongly recommends that you:

- Obfuscate the command client password whenever possible.
- Never accept passwords on the command line.
- Protect any secrets you manage.

## Monitoring & Auditing

---

As with any critical infrastructure component, you should constantly monitor your system and perform periodic and random audits (configuration, permissions, and so on).

### Policies and Roles

At a minimum, you should periodically review that the following settings match company policy and functional needs:

- Configuration settings
- Policies
- Administrative roles and associated permissions
- Which administrators are assigned to which roles
- Agent host enabled lists

---

**Note:** Verify that unauthorized users are not enabled through membership in a nested group.

---

## Monitoring Authentication Manager

RSA strongly recommends the following:

- Run network intrusion detection systems and host intrusion detection systems in your environment.
- Run Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). SNMP can monitor the state of Authentication Manager and perhaps indicate possible attacks.  
For information on using SNMP, see the Help topic "SNMP Overview".
- Monitor which ports are open. For information about port usage, see the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*.
- Audit and analyze system and application logs periodically. You can use a security information and event management (SIEM) solution, such as RSA enVision, to help you with this task.
- Retain log data in compliance with your security policies and local laws.  
For more information, see the Help topic "Configure Logging".

## Log Messages

---

RSA Authentication Manager generates log messages for all events. These messages are stored in log and database files according to the origin of the message. You can use these log files to monitor deployment activity and produce a record of events such as user logon requests or administrative operations.

Most log settings are instance-based, unless you choose to replicate logging configuration changes. The exception is log rotation settings, which are configured in the Operations Console on each instance.

The system does not log most successful read actions.

### Log Types

RSA Authentication Manager maintains the following types of logs:

- **Administrative Audit.** Log messages that record administrative actions, such as adding and editing users. This category does not include system level failures of administrative actions. Those messages are captured in the system log.
- **Runtime Audit.** Log messages that record any runtime activity, such as authentication and authorization of users.
- **System.** System level messages, such as "Server started" and "Connection Manager lost db connection." This category includes system level failures of administrative actions.

### Logging Levels

For each type of log, you can use the Security Console to configure the level of detail written to the log files. For example, you might choose to record only fatal errors in the Administrative Audit log, while recording all messages in the System log.

If you change the logging levels and want to return to the default values, select the values listed in the following table.

Log	Default Setting
Administrative Audit Log	Success
Runtime Audit Log	Success
System Log	Warning

## Real-Time Log Monitoring

---

RSA Authentication Manager provides these options to monitor your deployment in real time:

- Activity Monitors
- Support for a remote Syslog host
- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- Critical system event notifications

For information on these features, see the *RSA Authentication Manager Help*.

You can also view a user's authentication activity through the User Dashboard page in the Security Console. For more information, see the Help topic "User Dashboard."

## Appliance Logs

---

The appliance maintains operating system logs that track items such as syslog entries, appliance SNMP messages, and Network Time Protocol (NTP) server updates. You can use these logs to monitor the appliance and maintain an audit trail of appliance SNMP and time synchronization operations.

---

**Note:** These logs do not duplicate the messages contained in the RSA Authentication Manager logs. For more information, see the Help topic "Log Archives."

---

RSA Authentication Manager maintains the following appliance logs in the **var/log** directory:

**messages.** Contains syslog messages about the underlying operating system, such as disks, the BIOS, and memory usage and performance.

**net-snmpd.log.** Used for appliance SNMP log messages.

**ntp.** Changes to the date and time settings. For example, adding a new NTP server or synchronizing the date and time.

These logs are not included in the backup file, so you must manually back up the log files. Follow your organization's backup and archival policies to determine how often you must back up the log files.

To simplify log data management, the appliance uses a log rotation policy that creates multiple files for the appliance log files. You can specify the log rotation policy for the appliance logs.

For more information on logging, see the Help topics "Log Rotation Policy for the Appliance Logs" and "Configure Appliance Log Settings."

## Best Practices for Custom Reports

---

RSA recommends the following best practices for custom reports:

- For custom reports that directly access the Authentication Manager internal database, make sure that any passwords are obfuscated and rotated on a regular basis.
- Disable the report's service account after the report is run.
- Make sure the report service account only has read-only access to the database.

- Secure output from custom reports in a secure location with no network connectivity. If you need to transfer it over the network, first encrypt the output.
- Restrict access to the custom reports and their outputs.

## Communication Security

---

Secure communication between RSA Authentication Manager components or between Authentication Manager and external systems is enabled by default. You cannot configure the security mechanisms used.

An administrator can replace the existing secure sockets (SSL) certificate that secures communication between your browser and the Security Console, Operations Console, and Self-Service Console. An administrator can replace the default RSA virtual host certificate used by the web tier. There is no ability to alter the SSL security parameters. For more information, see the Help topics "Console Certificate" and "Web Tier Deployments."

### Port Usage

For a list of the ports that must be accessible to enable authentication, administration, replication, and other services on the network, see the chapter "Planning RSA Authentication Manager Network Integration," in the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*.

### SMTP Encryption

RSA Authentication Manager does not encrypt e-mail. For example, if you are distributing software tokens using dynamic seed provisioning (CT-KIP), you must provide users with the URL link to the CT-KIP server and a unique, one-time token activation code. To more securely provide Authentication Manager data to users, you can do the following:

- Provide the user with a QR Code that encapsulates the CT-KIP URL and activation code. Scanning the QR Code in the Self-Service Console imports and activates the token.
- Provide the information offline, such as by calling the users on the telephone.
- Copy the information into e-mail that you encrypt.
- Use a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) e-mail encryption gateway.
- If applicable, configure the Self-Service Console to provide the information to users. Self-Service is a web-based system that enables users to manage their profiles and authenticators. For more information, see the Help topic "RSA Self-Service Overview".

## Data Security

---

Data in the internal database is secure by default. Administrators cannot change the settings for securing data.

**Data Encryption.** Sensitive data stored in the internal database is encrypted. You cannot configure the encryption method or disable encryption.

**Data Integrity.** All security-related data in Authentication Manager has data integrity built-in. This detects if security-related data has been tampered with or moved between records. Compromised data causes decryption failure runtime errors in the Authentication Manager log files. You cannot configure or disable data integrity checking.

**Data Erasure.** You cannot configure secure erasure of data.

You can overwrite deleted appliance log files to make them more difficult to recover later. For more information, see the Help topic "Log Rotation Policy for the Appliance Logs."

## Chapter 2: Secure Deployment and Usage

Secure Appliance Deployment .....	24
Web Tier Deployment .....	25
Self-Service Console Hardening .....	25
Network Infrastructure Hardening .....	25
Firewalls .....	26
Protecting Sensitive Files .....	26
External Identity Sources .....	27
Agents .....	27
Suggested Security Practices for an Amazon Web Services Virtual Environment .....	29
Suggested Security Practices for an Azure Virtual Environment .....	30
Suggested Security Practices for a VMware Virtual Environment .....	30
Suggested Security Practices for a Hyper-V Virtual Environment .....	31
System Hardening .....	32

## Secure Appliance Deployment

---

After you deploy RSA Authentication Manager on a hardware appliance or a virtual appliance, the operating system console screen displays a Quick Setup Access Code along with a Quick Setup URL. The Quick Setup Access Code is only available until Quick Setup is complete.

The Quick Setup Access Code is required to begin Quick Setup, which configures the appliance as an RSA Authentication Manager instance. This code makes it harder for a malicious user to access Quick Setup and take control of the appliance.

---

**Note:** You must have the Quick Setup Access Code to begin Quick Setup.

---

RSA recommends the following guidelines when deploying an appliance:

- Deploy a hardware appliance in a test environment or in an isolated network. Only connect the appliance to your organization's network after Quick Setup is complete. Restrict physical and network access to the appliance to authorized individuals.  
For example, you can deploy a hardware appliance and run Quick Setup in a protected test environment that duplicates your production environment. After Quick Setup is complete, you can move the appliance into the production environment without changing the network settings, such as the hostname and the IP Address.  
Alternately, you can deploy the hardware appliance and run Quick Setup in a protected test environment and later change the network settings, such as the hostname and IP address, to attach the appliance to your production environment. For more information, see the Help topic "Primary or Replica Instance Network Settings Updates."
- Deploy a virtual appliance on an isolated network until Quick Setup is complete. Use VMware or Hyper-V to maintain full control over the appliance. Restrict network access to the appliance, and only allow authorized individuals to access the virtual appliance.
- If you access an appliance to run Quick Setup, and you discover that the appliance has already been configured or you receive error messages because Quick Setup is in progress, then do the following:
  - a. Contact other administrators in your organization to ensure that a malicious user is not trying to take control of the appliance.
  - b. If you believe that the appliance has been compromised, remove the primary or replica instance from your deployment. For instructions, see the topic "Remove a Primary or Replica Instance" in the *RSA Authentication Manager Administrator's Guide*.
  - c. Do one of the following:
    - For a hardware appliance, shut down the appliance and remove the machine from service.
    - For a virtual appliance, suspend the appliance, and quarantine the machine for further investigation.
  - d. Contact your IT department or RSA immediately.

## Web Tier Deployment

---

For an additional layer of security, you can deploy RSA Authentication Manager on a web tier to protect your private network. A web tier is a secure platform for installing and deploying the Self-Service Console, dynamic seed provisioning (CT-KIP), and the risk-based authentication (RBA) service.

The web tier protects your deployment by receiving and managing inbound internet traffic before it enters the private network. This prevents end users from accessing the private network through the Self-Service Console or web-based applications, such as SSL-VPNs, thin clients, or web portals. The web-tier server only sends a subset of the traffic, such as authentication traffic, securely to your private network.

RSA recommends that you do the following:

- Limit network port activity on the web tier. For a list of the ports that must be accessible, see the chapter "Planning RSA Authentication Manager Network Integration," in the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*.
- Configure an external firewall on your web-tier server.
- Shut down any unnecessary operating system services on the web-tier server. Authentication Manager requires networking services, but other operating system services are not needed. Follow the system hardening guidelines that are provided by Microsoft or Red Hat for your operating system.

Web tiers are not required, but your deployment might need them to satisfy your network configuration and requirements. For more information on the RSA Authentication Manager deployment types, see the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*.

## Self-Service Console Hardening

---

For additional security on the Self-Service Console, RSA strongly recommends the following:

- Deploy the Self-Service Console on a web tier to add an additional layer of security to your deployment.
- Examine your self-service policies and consider hardening self-service access and functionality:
  - Limit access to the Self-Service Console only to users inside your network.
  - RSA strongly recommends that you do not allow users to clear their PIN with the Self-Service Console. Users that must clear their PIN should contact the Help Desk.

## Network Infrastructure Hardening

---

To help ensure the highest level of security and reduce the risk of intrusion or malicious system or data access, RSA strongly recommends that you follow industry best practices for hardening the network infrastructure, including, without limitation:

- Run anti-virus and anti-malware tools with the most current definition files.
- Do not directly connect Authentication Manager servers to the Internet or place them in a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Instead, use a web tier to receive and manage inbound Internet traffic before it enters the private network. For more information on the RSA Authentication Manager deployment types, see the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*.

- Prevent unauthorized users from changing the time on any local Network Time Protocol (NTP) servers that are accessed by Authentication Manager. Authentication Manager requires accurate date and time settings for replication and authentication. If the token clock and the Authentication Manager system clock do not match, the generated tokencodes will not match, and authentication attempts can fail.
- For a VMware virtual appliance, you can do the following:
  - Follow VMware standard best practices and the information provided by the VMware Security and Compliance Community on the VMware website. VMware provides *VMware vSphere Security Hardening Guides* for different versions of the vSphere.
  - Use VMware open-source tools to verify that your deployment meets the standards described in the applicable *vSphere Security Hardening Guide* for your version of vSphere.
  - Use VMware Configuration Manager (VCM) to generate and send reports to RSA Archer Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC). RSA Archer can analyze your configuration and provide information on how to comply with best practices.
- For a Hyper-V virtual appliance, follow the Hyper-V hardening, virtual machine management recommendations, and standard best practices provided by the Microsoft Solution Accelerator *Hyper-V Security Guide*, the *Microsoft Security Guide for Hyper-V in Windows Server 2012*, and *Configuring Security in System Center 2012 - Virtual Machine Manager*. Microsoft provides these documents on the Microsoft Technet website.

## Firewalls

---

RSA strongly recommends that you use firewalls designed to remove unnecessary network access to RSA Authentication Manager, and follow network security best practices. RSA recommends that you deploy the instance in a subnet that also has an external hardware firewall to segregate it from the rest of the network.

The Authentication Manager instance has an internal firewall that limits traffic to specific ports. The internal firewall restricts inbound traffic to the hosts and services that provide product functionality. Outbound traffic is not restricted.

For information about port usage, see the chapter “Planning RSA Authentication Manager Network Integration” in the *RSA Authentication Manager Planning Guide*. Allow only inbound and outbound traffic on the documented ports to reach Authentication Manager.

## Protecting Sensitive Files

---

The RSA Authentication Manager Quick Setup generates keys and passwords used to access internal services such as the internal database. These credentials are stored in a secure vault in Authentication Manager, protected both by a system-specific key for unattended startup as well as the Operations Console administrator credentials for interactive operations. The Operations Console administrator credentials are created during Quick Setup.

You must secure the Operations Console administrator credentials, as they protect all of the system passwords required to run Authentication Manager.

When you plan a failover and disaster recovery strategy, you can export the system keys and passwords to an encrypted, password-protected file as part of a backup of all of the system passwords. When recovering from a

disaster, you can import the file back into the deployment. RSA strongly recommends storing the exported file in a safe and secure manner.

Consider keeping an encrypted copy of the following data offline in a secure physical location, such as a locked safe, in accordance with your disaster recovery and business continuity policies:

- Authentication Manager license files
- Backup data
- Authentication Manager passwords
- Archived log files and report data

To help protect online data, such as current log files and configuration files, RSA strongly recommends that you restrict access to the files and configure file permissions so that only trusted administrators are allowed to access them.

## External Identity Sources

---

External identity sources hold sensitive data that RSA Authentication Manager frequently accesses. RSA strongly recommends that you take the following steps designed to increase the security of this flow of information:

- Use SSL/TLS to communicate with all external identity sources, for example, LDAP or Active Directory.
- Change the password for the service accounts that connect to Active Directory and LDAP regularly.
- Use separate administrative accounts with their own credentials for external identity sources and Authentication Manager. This configuration helps to prevent an Activity Directory or LDAP vulnerability from becoming an Authentication Manager vulnerability. An attacker would need to obtain more than one set of credentials.

If you decide for convenience and ease of use to make domain users into Authentication Manager administrators, you can do the following:

- Set up the Security Console to require additional authentication methods. The domain user password should not be the only credential required to access Authentication Manager. For instructions, see [Configure Security Console Authentication Methods](#) on RSA Link.
- Restrict the scope and permissions of Authentication Manager administrative accounts, and restrict access by dividing your deployment into security domains. For example, an external LDAP administrator should not be an Authentication Manager Super Admin with full access to every Authentication Manager feature and your entire deployment. For more information, see [Configuring Administrative Role Scope and Permissions on page 14](#).

## Agents

---

Agent hosts are often more exposed to external threats than Authentication Manager. RSA strongly recommends that you observe the following precautions designed to help protect agent hosts:

- Update the operating system and hosted applications that are protected by agents with the latest security patches.
- Limit physical access to the devices that host agents.
- Limit remote access to privileged accounts on devices that host agents.

- Do not configure agents as open to all users. RSA strongly recommends restricting access to agents to specific users and groups.
- Ensure that the location where agents are installed is protected by strong access control lists (ACL).
- Run anti-virus and anti-malware software.
- Run host-based intrusion detection systems.
- If logging is enabled, write logs to a secure location.
- Do not modify the permissions and ownerships for any agent file. Do not allow unauthorized users to access the agent files.
- When you integrate an agent into a custom application, make sure you follow industry standard best practices to develop a secure custom application.

For more information, see the *RSA Authentication Agents Security Best Practices Guide* at <https://community.rsa.com/docs/DOC-42644>.

## Suggested Security Practices for an Amazon Web Services Virtual Environment

---

If you are using Amazon Web Services (AWS) virtual appliances, RSA recommends that you follow the standard AWS best practices for securely deploying and administering the virtual environment:

- Amazon describes a "Shared Responsibility Model." AWS secures the lower layers of the infrastructure stack, while the organizations using AWS are accountable for everything else up to and including the application layer. RSA hardens the RSA Authentication Manager appliance and provides guidelines for securely deploying Authentication Manager.
- Extend your existing common security model. Conventional security and compliance concepts still apply to the Cloud. You can leverage your existing processes and technologies.
- Consolidate identities to reduce your vulnerability to attacks. Instead of creating additional local AWS user accounts and Access Keys, use existing RSA Authentication Manager administrative accounts. Enable federated login to allow existing administrators to access any AWS service. These steps make it easier to manage administrative accounts, and prevents duplication and identity sprawl.
- Ensure accountability. Require administrators to log in with their individual accounts, instead of anonymous shared privileged accounts, such as Amazon `ec2_user`. Manage entitlements centrally from your identity source, and map existing roles and groups to AWS roles. All activities in a hybrid deployment must be linked to individual administrators for complete accountability. You can video record all privileged login sessions. Audit and record all attempts to log in to AWS portals and Amazon EC2 instances and all privilege elevation attempts.
- Use least privilege for administrative access. For the AWS Management Console, AWS services, Amazon EC2 instances, and access to hosted apps, administrators should be given only the necessary privileges to complete the required tasks. Use your existing directory infrastructure to manage and audit the roles and rights for each administrator. Give each administrator the appropriate access at the AWS service level and at the Amazon EC2 Instance level.
- Audit everything. Log and monitor all user sessions to Amazon EC2 instances. Administrators can log in directly with individual accounts, or they can log into the shared password management portal and (if their role allows) log in remotely to an instance using their enterprise credentials. Activities can be audited through session-recording at the proxy or host level, but Amazon recommends monitoring user sessions at the host level, because a proxy can be bypassed.
- Use multi-factor authentication everywhere. Amazon recommends requiring that even administrators with an appropriate role confirm their identities with an out-of-band factor, such as an RSA SecurID software token installed on a mobile device, before certain actions can be performed. This provides identity assurance and prevents attackers from using compromised credentials. Implement multi-factor authentication for AWS service management upon login and privilege elevation for Amazon EC2 instances, when checking out vaulted passwords, and when accessing enterprise apps.

For more information, see the *AWS Cloud Security Best Practices* whitepaper at <https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/security/new-whitepaper-aws-cloud-security-best-practices/>.

## Suggested Security Practices for an Azure Virtual Environment

---

If you are using Microsoft Azure virtual appliances, RSA recommends that you follow the standard best practices for securely deploying and administering the virtual environment:

- Microsoft describes a "Shared Responsibility Model." Microsoft secures the lower layers of the infrastructure stack, while the organizations using Azure are accountable for everything else up to and including the application layer. RSA hardens the RSA Authentication Manager appliance and provides guidelines for securely deploying Authentication Manager.
- Microsoft recommends installing a web application firewall and monitoring your applications. Web application firewall (WAF) is a feature of Azure Application Gateway that protects your web applications from common security vulnerabilities. This is in addition to the RSA Authentication Manager appliance internal firewall that limits traffic to specific ports.
- Require multifactor authentication for users, especially your administrators. Even administrators with an appropriate role should be required to confirm their identities with an out-of-band factor, such as an RSA SecurID software token installed on a mobile device, before certain actions can be performed.
- To deploy the Azure virtual appliance, RSA requires an Azure Virtual Network (VNet) and a private subnet. The virtual network dedicated to your Azure account is logically isolated from other virtual networks in the Azure cloud. A private subnet uses private IP addresses and is protected by an Azure Security Group. Virtual machines connected to an Azure virtual network can connect to devices on the same virtual network, different virtual networks, the internet, or your own on-premises networks.

For more information, see the following resources:

- Best practices for your Azure deployment at <https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/resources/security-best-practices-for-azure-solutions/>.
- Azure security best practices and patterns at <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/security-best-practices-and-patterns>.
- Azure security white papers at <https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/security-white-papers>.

## Suggested Security Practices for a VMware Virtual Environment

---

If you are using VMware virtual appliances, RSA recommends that you follow the standard VMware best practices for securely deploying and administering the virtual environment:

- Review the VMware security guidelines and documentation that is available in the VMware Security and Compliance Community on the VMware website.
- Follow the applicable *VMware vSphere Security Hardening Guide* for your version of vSphere to protect access to items such as the following:
  - Datastores. For example, limit access to virtual drives and virtual machine snapshot storage.
  - Network switches. For example, verify that switches are not in promiscuous mode.
  - Management consoles and interfaces.
  - Administrative user names and passwords.

- Use the VMware tools for hardening analysis to verify that the virtual environment complies with the standards of the applicable *VMware vSphere Security Hardening Guide* for your version of vSphere. These tools are available on the VMware website.
- You can create separate application and management networks, as described in the VMware security and best practices documentation. Administrators use the higher security management network to manage the virtual appliances. RSA Authentication Manager and agent hosts use the application network.
- If VMware vCenter is deployed, use vCenter to manage access. For more information, see your VMware documentation.
- Implement strong role-based access control. For example, you can create virtual infrastructure (VI) administrators and security administrators. VI administrators manage the entire virtual infrastructure. Security administrators are responsible for Authentication Manager administrative and security tasks. During Authentication Manager deployment, a VI administrator deploys the virtual appliance and provides the Quick Setup URL to a security administrator. The security administrator runs Quick Setup, which allows the security administrator to create a Super Admin, an Operations Console administrator, and the operating system password.
- For enhanced security, especially in an enterprise environment, you can create a shared administrative role. The VI administrator and the security administrator each know half of the shared password. You should continue to use role-based controls across the entire infrastructure, but major changes must be performed by the shared administrative role. For example, you might require the shared account to delete a virtual machine, change memory settings, or change the network settings for a switch that is part of the virtual infrastructure.  
The shared role requires the VI and security administrators to discuss and agree on important decisions. These discussions help to prevent the configuration problems that are a major issue in virtual environments.

## Suggested Security Practices for a Hyper-V Virtual Environment

---

If you are using Hyper-V virtual appliances, RSA recommends that you follow the standard Hyper-V best practices for securely deploying and administering the virtual environment:

- Review the Hyper-V security guidelines and documentation that is available on the Microsoft Technet website. This material includes:
  - The Microsoft Solution Accelerator *Hyper-V Security Guide*
  - The Microsoft *Security Guide for Hyper-V in Windows Server 2012*, including Chapter 5, "Best Practices Checklist"
  - *Configuring Security in System Center 2012 - Virtual Machine Manager*
- Follow the Microsoft security recommendations to protect access to items such as the following:
  - Datastores. For example, limit access to virtual drives, virtual machine libraries, and any location where you store Hyper-V checkpoints.
  - Network switches. For example, verify that switches are not in promiscuous mode.
  - Management consoles and interfaces.
  - Administrative user names and passwords.

- You can create separate application and management networks on different virtual local area networks (VLANs). Administrators use the higher security management network to manage the virtual appliances. RSA Authentication Manager and agent hosts use the application network.
- If the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) is deployed, use the VMM Console to manage access. For more information, see *Configuring Security in System Center 2012 - Virtual Machine Manager* on the Microsoft Technet website.
- Implement strong role-based access control. For example, you can create virtual infrastructure (VI) administrators and security administrators. VI administrators manage the entire virtual infrastructure. Security administrators are responsible for Authentication Manager administrative and security tasks. During Authentication Manager deployment, a VI administrator deploys the virtual appliance and provides the Quick Setup URL to a security administrator. The security administrator runs Quick Setup, which allows the security administrator to create a Super Admin, an Operations Console administrator, and the operating system password.

## System Hardening

---

RSA Authentication Manager was developed using industry-standard best practices for security and the EMC Product Security Policy and Security Development Lifecycle. The lifecycle is a repeatable and measurable process that enables RSA to optimally apply security controls during the product development lifecycle.

The RSA Authentication Manager appliance is intended to be a closed system for a single purpose: running the RSA Authentication Manager services. While there are other tools and services available in the operating system, the appliance is not a general-purpose system, and administrators should not attempt to use or configure additional features. Such unsupported changes may reduce the security of the appliance, creating security vulnerabilities in your installation.

When working with the appliance, administrators must be aware of the security implications, including but not limited to the following:

- System access is limited by design. Adding additional operating system users or modifying user privileges or group membership could allow unauthorized access.
- Files and applications should be protected. File permissions should not be modified. Be aware of any copies of protected files that are created, protect transferred files with strong passwords, and remove any temporary files.
- The appliance includes only the operating system components required to support RSA Authentication Manager. Due to the nature of operating system component packages and dependencies, some unused modules are included on the system. These features should not be used or enabled.
- Files and applications should not be transferred to the appliance. Various vulnerabilities could be introduced with untrusted data and applications.
- The appliance should not be connected to any file servers or networks that are not completely secure.

The appliance security assumes that the system is deployed as described in this guide, in a secure network and physical environment accessible only by trusted administrators. Most of the normal management of the appliance is expected to be performed from the Operations Console. Only a limited amount of work will require access to the operating system for infrequent maintenance tasks, such as when running documented command line utilities or when working with RSA Customer Support.

## BIOS Hardening

As part of hardening the appliance image, RSA preconfigures the hardware appliance with a password. The default BIOS password is rsabios.

To protect access to the BIOS, RSA recommends that you change the preconfigured BIOS password to a strong password of your choice. Refer to your hardware owner’s manual for information on changing and maintaining the system password.

Be sure to remember and secure the new BIOS password. Entrust knowledge of the BIOS password only to a limited number of personnel who require the password to access the hardware appliance BIOS.

## Command Line Privileges

The following commands are used to diagnose issues or maintain the appliance. For auditing and authorization purposes, you must use a specific administrator account to execute these commands.

The following table describes the commands and the user account which is allowed to run each command.

Command	Allowed User	Description
Operating system commands (for example: scp, sftp)	The <b>rsaadmin</b> operating system account.	For a description of an operating system command, run the command with the help option. For example: scp --help.
RSA Authentication Manager command line utilities (CLUs)	The <b>rsaadmin</b> operating system account and Authentication Manager account assigned the administrative role  <b>Note:</b> The CLU prompts you to enter the required credentials, for example, an Operations Console Administrator or a Super Admin user name and password.	Utility that you access from the command line.

## NFS Server and Windows Share Security

You can use a Network File System (NFS) or Windows share for:

**Backup and restore operations.** By default, when you create a backup, the appliance encrypts the data and saves the backup file to the local hard disk. However, you can configure the appliance to save backup files to an NFS or Windows share, and then restore a backup from the same location, if necessary.

**Storing and applying appliance updates.** You can copy appliance updates to an NFS or Windows share and then apply the updates to the appliance.

RSA Authentication Manager backup files are encrypted, but Authentication Manager update files are not encrypted. RSA recommends that you protect your NFS or Windows share and the network path. If you use an NFS or Windows share, do the following:

- Secure the NFS or Windows share directories to protect data and prevent file tampering and disclosure. For example, for a Windows share, configure a username and password.

- Secure the network path between the NFS or Windows share and the appliance. The update files are not encrypted when traversing the network.

---

**Note:** If you are using a Windows share, RSA Authentication Manager 8.5 requires the SMBv2 or SMBv3 protocol. SMBv1 is no longer supported.

---

### RSA Authentication Manager Services That Start Automatically

RSA Authentication Manager does not install services that are not used. Authentication Manager only runs necessary services. The following table lists the Authentication Manager services that start automatically.

Service Name	Description	Details
console	RSA Console Server	Hosts the Security Console and the Self-Service Console
biztier	RSA Runtime Server	
admin	RSA Administration Server with Operations Console	Hosts the Operations Console
db	RSA Database Server	
primary_replication	RSA Replication (Primary)	Runs on the primary instance only.
replica_replication	RSA Replication (Replica)	Runs on the replica instance only.
radius	RSA RADIUS Server	
radiusoc	RSA RADIUS Server Operations Console	
rsa identity router	RSA Identity Router	Embedded identity router

You can manage Authentication Manager services manually. You can perform the following actions on a selected service or on all services at the same time:

- Stop
- Start
- Display current status
- Restart

For security purposes, the appliance does not start the Secure Shell (SSH) service automatically. Before you can log on to the appliance operating system using an SSH client, you must enable SSH in the Operations Console.

For information on how to enable SSH and how to manually manage Authentication Manager services, see the chapter "Advanced Administration" in the *RSA Authentication Manager Administrator's Guide*.

## Chapter 3: Secure Maintenance

RSA Authentication Manager Updates .....	36
Operating System Access .....	36
Run Clam Antivirus Software .....	37
Protecting Backups .....	38

## RSA Authentication Manager Updates

---

RSA issues product updates periodically for RSA Authentication Manager in the form of patches and service packs. RSA recommends applying product updates as they become available to ensure that the deployment is secure and efficient. For each product update, RSA provides release notes that contain important information about applying the update. To avoid problems, you should read all of the information in the release notes before you apply the update.

You download product updates from RSA Link at <https://community.rsa.com/community/products/securid>. Updates are provided in the form of an ISO image. RSA recommends that you do not burn the ISO image to a physical DVD or CD. Instead, save the ISO image in a directory that is accessible to the deployment.

You use the Operations Console to apply product updates on each primary and replica instance. After you download a product update, you specify the location of the ISO image. You can apply an individual update through your local browser, or you can scan for stored updates in an NFS share, a Windows shared folder, or a DVD/CD. After scanning, you can select an individual update to apply.

---

**Note:** Apply updates to embedded third-party products only as part of RSA-delivered updates. For example, RSA provides the required updates to the virtual appliance and hardware appliance operating system.

---

If the deployment includes a web tier, you must update the web tier when you update the version of Authentication Manager. Authentication Manager displays an update button in the Operations Console for each web tier that is not up-to-date.

## Operating System Access

---

Although you use the Operations Console and the Security Console to administer RSA Authentication Manager, there may be times when you need to access the appliance operating system to perform the following advanced administration tasks:

- Stop and start Authentication Administration Console services.
- Troubleshoot complex appliance problems that cannot be resolved through the Operations Console.
- Run Authentication Administration Console command line utilities (CLUs).

You can access the appliance operating system with a Secure Shell (SSH) client, a software application that uses SSH to connect with a remote computer. The client is installed on a local computer that has a network connection to the appliance. Before you can access the appliance operating system through an SSH client, you must enable SSH on the appliance.

You can also access the operating system on a virtual appliance with Amazon Web Services, the VMware vSphere Client, the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) Console, or the Hyper-V Manager.

You can define session lifetime settings for logging on to the appliance operating system. Session lifetime is an important security feature because it prevents administrators from keeping sessions open indefinitely, leaving them vulnerable to unauthorized access. The session lifetime settings apply when you access a virtual appliance or hardware appliance operating system with an SSH client or when you access a virtual appliance operating system with the VMware vSphere Client, the Hyper-V VMM Console, or the Hyper-V Manager. For instructions, see the Help topic "Edit Session Lifetime Settings for Operating System Access."

An operating system account password is required to access the operating system directly or through SSH.

## Run Clam Antivirus Software

---

Each RSA Authentication Manager instance includes Clam Antivirus (ClamAV) software. ClamAV is an open-source software toolkit that is intended to reduce the risk of intrusion or malicious system or data access. Apply software updates to ClamAV only as part of RSA-delivered updates. You are responsible for updating antivirus definition files and running ClamAV in order to scan any Authentication Manager instance for known malware.

### Before you begin

- This procedure assumes a knowledge of Linux commands.
- For the operating system account User ID **rsaadmin**, obtain the operating system password.
- To access the operating system with a secure shell (SSH) client, you must enable SSH. You can also access the operating system on a virtual appliance in Amazon Web Services, the VMware vSphere client, the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager Console, or the Hyper-V Manager.

### Procedure

1. Log on to the appliance with the User ID **rsaadmin** and the current operating system password:
  - On a hardware appliance or the Amazon Web Services appliance, log on to the appliance using an SSH client.
  - On a VMware virtual appliance, log on to the appliance using an SSH client or the VMware vSphere client.
  - On a Hyper-V virtual appliance, log on to the appliance using an SSH client, the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager Console, or the Hyper-V Manager.
2. Update the antivirus definition files. Choose one of the following procedures:
  - If the Authentication Manager instance has access to the Internet, you can automatically download and apply the latest antivirus definition files. Type the following command:

```
sudo /usr/bin/freshclam
```

- If the Authentication Manager instance does not have access to the Internet, manually download the **main.cvd** and **daily.cvd** antivirus definition files from the ClamAV web site: <http://www.clamav.net/>. Copy the files into the **/var/lib/clamav/** directory on the instance.
3. To scan files and directories for viruses manually, type the following line:

```
sudo clamscan -r / --exclude-dir=/proc --exclude-dir=/sys --exclude-dir=/opt/rsa/am/rsapgdata --follow-dir-symlinks=0 --follow-file-symlinks=0 --log=/var/log/clamav.log
```

To schedule automatic virus scans, create a **cron** job that runs the same command.

4. Check the scan results in **/var/log/clamav.log**.

## Protecting Backups

---

You can use the Operations Console to create a backup of the deployment data using one of the following methods:

- **Back Up Now.** A manual, one-time backup of the deployment.
- **Schedule Backups.** Regular backups of the deployment according to a schedule that you specify.

RSA recommends that you maintain a current backup. If a successful backup has not been created during the past seven days and Critical System Notifications are configured, the deployment sends a notification.

The deployment encrypts backups because backups contain sensitive information. During the backup process, you must specify a password that is used for encryption. During the restore process, you provide this password so that the backup can be decrypted and checked for integrity. Be sure to record the password in a safe location, as dictated by your organization's policies, so that it will be available when you need to restore the deployment.

You can save your backup on the appliance or at a remote location. RSA recommends saving a current backup in a remote location so that you can restore your deployment to recover from a disaster. RSA recommends periodically testing your backups on a spare, non-production system, to ensure that you will be able to restore if a disaster occurs.

For instructions, see the Help topics "Create a Backup using Backup Now" and "Create a Backup Using Schedule Backups."

## Chapter 4: Physical Security Controls

Protecting the Authentication Manager Environment ..... 40

## Protecting the Authentication Manager Environment

---

It is very important to protect all physical, local and remote access to the Authentication Manager environment, including the Authentication Manager server and agent hosts. It is important to restrict all access methods to the bare minimum required to maintain Authentication Manager.

---

**Note:** RSA strongly recommends that your Authentication Manager test environments not be exact copies of your full production environment. If they are, you should take the same precautions to protect the test environment as you do your production environment.

---

### Physical Security Controls

Physical security controls protect resources against unauthorized physical access and physical tampering. Authentication Manager is designed to be a critical infrastructure component so it is important that physical access be restricted to authorized personnel only. Restricting physical access is an important security measure, even in a virtual environment with shared resources. After installation, authorized users only need limited access to Authentication Manager, and either the hardware appliance or the physical machine hosting the virtual appliance.

RSA recommends using the following physical security controls:

- Place the hardware appliance or the physical machine hosting the virtual appliance in a locked cabinet. As with any other hardware device in your network, allow only authorized users to physically access the hardware appliance or the host system.
- In a virtual environment, protect the physical machine hosting the virtual appliance. Protect the hosts where virtual disks, virtual memory, and any VMware snapshots or Hyper-V checkpoints are stored.
- Place physical locks on all external interfaces.
- Place tamper evident stickers on each server chassis and other hardware.
- Employ strong access control and intrusion detection mechanisms where the product cabling, switches, servers, and storage hardware reside.
- If you use a DVD/CD or USB flash drive to apply updates to the primary or replica instance, you must securely manage the removable media. You want to prevent unauthorized personnel from copying files onto the media that might harm the instance at the next use.
- Secure the server room such that it's only accessible by authorized personnel and audit that access. For example, use room locks that allow traceability and auditing.
- Minimize the number of people who have physical access to devices hosting Authentication Manager server, agents, and instances of the software development kit (SDK).
- After Quick Setup is complete, allow only authorized users to have direct physical access to the hardware appliance. A user with the `rsaadmin` operating system account password can log on to the appliance by attaching a keyboard and a monitor or by accessing a remote management module port.

### Remote Access to Server Environments

RSA recommends limiting remote access as follows:

- Remote access to server system components should be limited. For example, restrict access to the operating system on a VMware or Hyper-V virtual appliance through the OS Console in the VMware vSphere Client, the Hyper-V System Center Virtual Machine Manager Console, or the Hyper-V Manager. The Amazon Web Services appliance is only accessible through Secure Shell (SSH).

- RSA Authentication Manager supports Secure Shell (SSH) as a remote management capability. By default, SSH is disabled. Only enable SSH when it is absolutely required for maintenance. Disable SSH immediately when maintenance is complete.  
For instructions on using SSH, see the Help topic "Enable Secure Shell on the Appliance."
- Remote access to any host or system connected to or managed by Authentication Manager, such as hosts with agents installed, should be limited as indicated above. In addition, disable remote access methods for the operating system, for example telnet or ftp, that communicate over unsecured channels.



## Chapter 5: Supporting End Users

Procedures and Training .....	44
Preventing Social Engineering Attacks .....	44
Confirming a User's Identity .....	44
PIN Management .....	45
Advice for Users .....	46
Emergency Access and Static Tokencodes .....	47

## Procedures and Training

---

It is important to have well-defined policies around help desk procedures for RSA Authentication Manager. Help Desk administrators must understand the importance of PIN strength and the sensitivity of data such as the user's login name and token serial number. Creating an environment where an end user is frequently asked for this kind of sensitive data increases the opportunity for social engineering attacks. Train end users to provide, and Help Desk administrators to request, the least amount of information needed in each situation.

For information on the most common tasks that a Help Desk Administrator needs to manage Authentication Manager, see the *RSA Authentication Manager Help Desk Administrator's Guide*.

## Preventing Social Engineering Attacks

---

Fraudsters frequently use social engineering attacks to trick unsuspecting employees or individuals into divulging sensitive data that can be used to gain access to protected systems. Use the following guidelines to reduce the likelihood of a successful social engineering attack:

- Help Desk administrators should only ask for a user's User ID over the phone when he or she calls the help desk. Help Desk administrators should never ask for token serial numbers, tokencodes, PINs, passwords, and so on.

---

**Note:** When resynchronizing tokens, users should enter tokencodes in the administrative interface under the supervision of the logged-on administrator. If the user cannot enter tokencodes in this way, make sure that the user adheres to the other recommendations in this section and that administrators adhere to the recommendations in [Confirming a User's Identity below](#) when it is necessary to resynchronize a token.

---

- The Help Desk telephone number should be well-known to all users.
- Help Desk administrators should authenticate the user's identity before performing any administrative action on a user's token or PIN. For example, ask the user one or more questions to which only he or she knows the answer. For more information, see [Confirming a User's Identity below](#).
- If Help Desk administrators need to initiate contact with a user, they should not request any user information. Instead, users should be instructed to call back the Help Desk at a well-known Help Desk telephone number to ensure that the original request is legitimate.
- To confirm that all PIN changes are requested by authorized users, you should have a policy in place to notify users when their PINs have been changed. For example, send an e-mail notification to the user's corporate e-mail address, or leave a voicemail message. Users that suspect a change was made by an unauthorized person should contact the Help Desk.

## Confirming a User's Identity

---

It is critical that Help Desk Administrators verify the end user's identity before performing any Help Desk operations on the user's behalf. Recommended actions include:

- Call the end user back on a phone owned by the organization and on a number that is already stored in the system.

---

**Note:** Be wary of using mobile phones for identity confirmation, even if they are owned by the company, as mobile phone numbers are often stored in locations that are vulnerable to tampering or social engineering.

---

- Send the user an e-mail to a company e-mail address. If possible, use encrypted e-mail.
- Work with the employee's manager to verify the user's identity.
- Verify the identity in person.
- Use multiple open-ended questions from employee records (for example: Name one person in your group; What is your badge number?). Avoid yes/no questions.

## PIN Management

---

RSA strongly recommends the following to help protect RSA SecurID PINs:

- For software tokens:
  - When software tokens are issued as PINPad-style tokens (the Authentication Type is set to PINPad-style in the software token profile), the software token PIN should be equal in length to the tokencode, and all numeric.
  - When software tokens are issued as fob-style tokens (the Authentication Type is set to Fob-style in the software token profile), the software token PIN should be alphanumeric and eight digits in length. To require alphanumeric PINs, an administrator must configure the token policy in the Security Console.
- Your corporate token policy should require the use of 6-character to 8-character PINs. Do not use 4-character numeric PINs. RSA recommends that your PINs require alphanumeric characters (a-z, A-Z, 0-9) when the token type supports them. You must configure Authentication Manager to allow these characters.
- Configure Authentication Manager to lock out a user after three failed authentication attempts. Require manual intervention to unlock users who repeatedly fail authentication. For information about configuring the number of failed attempts, see the Help topic "Add a Lockout Policy."
- To roll out a new Authentication Manager token policy for PINs, set the maximum PIN lifetime to a period that is short enough so that all users will be forced into New PIN mode but long enough where users will not be forced to change their PIN multiple times. If your user population is segmented by security domains, it is recommended that you stagger the policy change by security domain to avoid overwhelming your Help Desk.

Be sure to notify the affected users in advance that they should authenticate and change their PIN as soon as possible. To verify all users have changed their PINs, run a report detailing user authentication activity for that period of time.

After the Authentication Manager token policy rollout is complete and you have verified that all users have changed their PINs in accordance with the new policy, the Authentication Manager token policy for PIN lifetimes should be restored to adhere to your corporate security policy. If you have changed your Authentication Manager token policy settings and users are not being prompted for a new PIN, please contact RSA Customer Support for information on how to force the new PIN mode.

---

**Note:** It is important to strike the right balance between security best practices and user convenience. If system-generated alphanumeric 8-digit PINs are too complex, find the strongest token policy for PINs that best suits your user community.

---

For information about changing to stronger PINs, see the Help topic “Edit a Token Policy.”

- You should notify users before you update the policy. If you have a large number of users who do not meet the new policy, you may experience an increase in Help Desk calls.
- You can increase the complexity of user PINs by requiring system-generated PINs. However, you may be reducing security as people may write down complex PINs, or call the Help Desk more frequently to have their PINs cleared.

Increased phone calls to the Help Desk to clear PINs increases the possibility of a social engineering attack from unauthorized individuals posing as users. For more information, see [Confirming a User’s Identity on page 44](#).

- Instruct all users to never tell anyone their PINs. Administrators should never ask for or know the user’s PIN.
- Configure policies that restrict the re-use of PINs.
- Configure the use of the dictionary to prevent the use of simple PINs.
- Configure Authentication Manager to require users to change their PINs at regular intervals. These intervals should be no more than 60 days. If you use 4-digit numeric PINs, the intervals should be no more than every 30 days. For software tokens, the PIN should be equal in length to the tokencode, and all numeric.

For information about requiring periodic PIN changes for users, see the Help topic “Edit a Token Policy.” Note that more frequent PIN changes may also result in an increase in Help Desk calls.

- RSA strongly recommends that you do not use system-generated PINs in conjunction with the RADIUS PAP protocol.
- You can gradually phase in a requirement for users to change their PINs. Changing a token policy assigned to a security domain changes the policy for all users in the domain. It is not possible to change a policy for a subset of users in a security domain. However, it is possible to effectively change a policy on a subset of users by moving those users to a new security domain with the changed policy. For instructions, see the Help topics “Edit a Token Policy” and “Move Users Between Security Domains.”

If a token policy is assigned to more than one security domain and you want to change the policy for only one of the security domains, duplicate the existing policy. You can make the necessary changes to the duplicate policy and assign the policy to the security domain you want to change. For instructions, see the Help topics “Duplicate a Token Policy” and “Assign a Token Policy to a Security Domain.”

## Advice for Users

---

**Note:** Consider regular training to communicate this guidance to users.

---

RSA strongly recommends that you instruct users to do the following:

- Never give the token serial number, PIN, tokencode, token, passcode or passwords to anyone.
- To help avoid phishing attacks, do not enter tokencodes into links that you clicked in e-mail. Instead, type in the URL of the reputable site to which you want to authenticate.
- Inform users of what information requests to expect from Help Desk administrators.
- Always log out of applications when you’re done with them.
- Always lock your desktop when you step away.

- Regularly close your browser and clear your cache of data.
- Immediately report lost or stolen tokens.

## Emergency Access and Static Tokencodes

---

Use the Security Console to generate emergency access tokencodes. For instructions, see the Help topic "Assign a Temporary Fixed Tokencode".

RSA strongly recommends that you do the following:

- Confirm the user's identity before assigning the user an emergency access tokencode. For example, ask the user a question to which only he or she knows the answer.
- Discontinue the use of static passwords.
- Ensure that emergency access tokencodes expire within a short period of time. RSA strongly recommends that emergency access tokencodes expire within a day. Emergency access tokencodes are not a permanent solution to lost tokens.
- Use on-demand tokencodes for emergency access when possible.
- Verify that the user's phone number has not changed.